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Law and the Biology of Rape:
Reflections on Transitions
Owen D. Jones*
[S]tatistics about the incidence of rape are bewildering and diverse.1
2[Riape law is still a mess.
INTRODUCTION
The seriousness of the problem of violence against women no longer
needs an introductory string of statistics to establish. Rape, in particular,
since at least Brownmiller and Russell,3 has justifiably emerged as the
subject of both important scholarship and significant efforts to reduce its
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1. Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling,
and Law, 88 Nw. U.L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1994).
2. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1780, 1796 (1992).
3. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); DIANA
E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITIcs OFRAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (1975).
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incidence.4 By any measure, and largely through the influence of feminist
writers, we now recognize that coercive copulation, and the fear of coercive
copulation, impose limits on female autonomy unacceptable in a civilized
society.
The study of rape, to date, has largely reflected the disciplinary
divisions popular within universities. There are psychiatric perspectives,
sociological perspectives, women's studies perspectives, and biological
perspectives, among others. Although each offers something, it is not
uncommon to see the claim or assumption that one offers everything.
Legal thinkers, charged with actually doing something to prevent rape,
consequently face a bewildering number of seemingly competitive claims,
statistics, arguments, and assertions. Typically, only one of these theories
at a time procures most-favored-theory status, and has its views of the
matter embodied in laws and legal processes. Yet it is entirely unclear that
any single perspective will, in the end, provide law with sufficient leverage
against rape. For we have no reason to believe that the phenomenon of
rape respects the artificial distinctions in knowledge that university
department structures happen to reflect. And our progress in preventing
rape has been, while somewhat positive, far more modest than we would
prefer.5  This recommends that the search for a more effective
4. See, e.g., MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 244-53 (1989); SUSAN ESTRiCH, REAL RAPE
(1987); CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION
AND ITS IMPACT (1992); Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing
Look at One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35 (1995);
Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997); Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV.
663 (1999); Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 Cm.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming
2000); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW (1998); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781
(1992); David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194 (1997); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Dut. Rules: Rape
Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1999); JULIE A. ALLISON &
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME (1993); A MOST
DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed.,
1999). For an overview of some of the social science research on rape, see Barry Burkhart &
Mary Ellen Fromuth, Individual Psychological and Social Psychological Unde rstandings of
Sexual Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION 75 (E. Grauerholz & M.A. Koralewski eds., 1991).
5. Researchers have generally concluded that, with rare exceptions, legal reforms have
not significantly increased either rape reporting or the probabilities of arrests and
convictions for rape. See, e.g., Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary
Look at the Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come? 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 554, 573 (1993); Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and
Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 117, 149-50 (1991);
Carol Bohmer, Acquaintance Rape and the Law, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN
CRIME 317, 326-27 (Andrea Parrot & Lauri Bechhofer eds., 1991) David P. Bryden & Sonja
Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1283-
94 (1997).
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understanding of rape continue.
It seems increasingly likely that future advances in rape prevention will
require more concerted efforts to integrate knowledge across disciplinary
boundaries. Some such efforts are underway. They are complicated,
however, not only by latent turfism within different comers of the
academy, but also by the growing disjunction between them in vocabulary,
methodology, and general orientation.
Law, which tends to be more a synthesizer than a generator of
knowledge, is in many ways well suited to help foster interdisciplinary
communication. Since the extent of law's ability to prevent rape is a
function of its behavioral model of rape-that is, its understanding of what
influences rape's incidence-it follows that the more accurate and
comprehensive the behavioral model is, the better law can do its job.6
Consequently, all those interested in preventing rape have an interest in
helping to construct a more integrated, and hopefully more robust, model of
rape behavior.
In a prior article, I tried to assist that overall integrative endeavor by
attempting to diminish the gap between the social science and the life
science perspectives on rape.7 I undertook this for three reasons. First, I
am persuaded that rape is a serious problem. Second, I am persuaded that
the persistence of the historical gap between the social and life sciences in
understanding behavior imposes serious costs on society that are measured,
in part, in less successful prevention of undesirable behavior than might
otherwise be the case. Third, I am persuaded that the biological literature
on biobehavioral influences on sexual aggression has not received a full
and fair hearing, and may, in the end, have something useful to contribute
to law's efforts to prevent rape.
Space limitations prevent an adequate summary, here, of the basic
principles of behavioral biology and the theories of how sexual aggression
can be understood against the background of those principles. I have
discussed these elsewhere at length, offering a guide to common but
avoidable errors in evaluating them, and speculating on possible legal
applications if those theories should, over time, prove robust.8 In this
Article I offer supplemental observations, in furtherance of the general
integrative enterprise. Specifically, I address why law's model of rape
behavior is likely to incorporate insights from biobehavioral science in
6. I have explored the relationship between behavioral models and law in Owen D. Jones,
Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssUEs 167, 167-173 (1997), and Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology,
Morality, and the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming May 2000).
7. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, Sex Culture, and the Biology of
Rape]. For further views, of participants at an interdisciplinary Colloquium on Biology and
SexualAggression, see Special Issues numbers 1 & 2 of 39 JuRIMETrics (1999-2000).
8. Id.
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future years, and how the legal system might best prepare for a transition
from the sequential installation of most-favored-theory to a synthetic
approach that incorporates both life science and social science insights.
I have two main points. The first is that modem biology makes it
abundantly clear that all behavior is a function of both genes and
environment--each meaningless without the other. Consequently, it is no
longer valid to speak of whether biology (the study of the interaction of
genes and environment) influences rape, or any other human behavior for
that matter. The issues, more accurately, address how it does so, and how,
if at all, understanding how it does so may improve our ability to deter rape
and to increase female bodily autonomy. The second point is that the
transition to a behavioral model that supplements existing knowledge about
rape with biobehavioral perspectives need not be as traumatic as commonly
feared. No thoughtful thinker of any stripe, for example, suggests that the
existence of biobehavioral influences on rape provides argument for
excusing rape. And an informed and legally useful understanding of
biological perspectives on rape (which are far different from what common
caricatures portray) can further our shared goal of reducing the incidence
of rape. This requires, however, that the transition to a richer behavioral
model is approached systematically. I propose such an approach below.
Part I briefly considers the threshold question: why consider biology at
all? Part II proposes that the first step in transitioning to a more accurate
and more useful model of rape behavior is to avoid a number of common
definitional ambiguities that plague most rape discussions. Because those
ambiguities are particularly likely to foster misunderstandings about
biobehavioral perspectives, Part I also clarifies the scope of what
biobehavioral theories address. Part III proposes that the commonly
tangled realm of rape theory be divided into two distinct (though in some
contexts overlapping) realms: one of theories about the meanings of rape,
and the other of theories about the causes of rape. Part IV proposes that
causes of rape, in turn, be sorted into two kinds, the precise and necessary
inter-relationship of which can be understood in a way that provides
important and continuing utility for the ongoing research in both social
science and life science perspectives on sexual aggression. Part V offers
thoughts on two complexities arising from the transition to an integrated
model of rape behavior.
9. The vast bulk of recent newspaper, television, and radio commentary concerning
theories of biobehavioral influences on sexual aggression reflects material
misunderstandings about what the various theories do and do not say. A number of these
misunderstandings are addressed in Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note
7, at 872-95.
[Vol. 11:2
LAW AND THE BIOLOGY OF RAPE
I. WHY CONSIDER BIOLOGY AT ALL?
A. REASONS NOTTO CONSIDER BIOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF RAPE
At the risk of seeming to undercut my first point, that the study of
biology is useful to understanding rape, I want to start by acknowledging
some of the many reasons that have been or could be advanced for
excluding biological perspectives. Specifically, there are at least seven
reasons to reject the idea that there are biobehavioral influences on human
sexual aggression.
First, anti-feminists have often appealed to biology as justification for
repressive policies.10 It is therefore not wholly irrational to expect that-as
biobehavioral knowledge is assimilated-some people will claim that rape
is "the inevitable result of innate male aggression coupled with an
uncontrollable sexual need."'" Annexation of biology by those with pre-
existing political agendas could increase tensions, rather than reduce them,
and thereby partially or completely offset possible gains in reducing the
incidence of rape. Second, exploring the biology of rape behavior might
shift the focus of social and legal concern from the victim to the
perpetrator, de-emphasizing harmfulness 12 and suggesting that the victim
somehow precipitated her attack.1 3 Third, the more 'naturalized' rape is,
the more women may appear, to their ultimate detriment, to be the natural
victims of rape.' 4 And the more this is so, the more difficult it may become
10. As Professor Deborah L. Rhode notes, in JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989), during the
early years of the women's movement, the ideology of the anti-feminists was rooted in
"biology, the experience of evolution, and the will of the Creator." Id. at 14.
11. SUE LEES, RULING PASSIONS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, REPUTATION AND THE LAW 6 (1997)
(criticizing such a view).
12. "[S]o long as rape is seen as an act of sexuality rather than aggression and hostility, it
will continue to be interpreted as predominantly pleasurable to both parties rather than
harmful to the victim." SUZANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 11 (1987), cited in LEES, supra
note 11.
13. See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
CRIME 100 (1993) ("A person who believes that rapists are sexually motivated may or may
not feel that a woman should be held responsible for preventing her own rape."); NANCY A.
MATrHEWS, CONFRONTING RAPE: THE FEMINIST ANTI-RAPE MOVEMENT AND THE STATE 14
(1994) ("In the effort to shift blame from victims of rape, activists emphasized the violence
in rape and down-played the role of sexuality.... The [early 70s] anti-rape movement
removed itself from such troubling questions by promoting the idea that 'Rape is violence,
not sex."').
14. As several commentators have noted, one advantage of defining rape in terms of
power, control, and violence is that victims no longer appear to be the 'natural' victims of
this particular crime. See, e.g., BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN
BOSNiA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA 90, 119 (1996).
This definition also removes rape from any realm of sex (biological
naturalness) or sexuality (the powerful workings of desire, used in some
cultures to defend rapists and to demonize victims). It thus diminishes the
possibility that rape of female persons by male persons might be considered
natural, something desired by the victim, something that happens when the
perpetrator is swept off his feet. By clearly stating that rape is an abuse of
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to consider rape a crime of violence, worthy of our most serious deterrence
efforts.
Fourth, the theories of biobehavioral influence are technical and subtle,
and people may be more likely to misunderstand, mis-cite, and misapply
them than to get them right. 15  Fifth, the larger the perceived sexual
component to rape, the harder it may be to encourage society to focus on
underlying systemic problems of male power and dominance. 16 Sixth, the
existence of biobehavioral influences may lead to claims that rapists are not
meaningfully responsible for their behavior.' 7  Finally, excluding
discussion of biology, and emphasizing the violent aspects of rape, has in
prior contexts actually facilitated a number of positive changes in rape
law.'
8
B. REASONS TO CONSIDER BIOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF RAPE
The concerns just articulated have substance. And I trust that other
authors will continue to explore them, so that they may be carefully
weighed against some of what follows below. For reasons that follow,
however, it seems probable that in the end we can and should conclude that
future gains in preventing rape will require attention to biobehavioral
perspectives. Such attention need not (and in truth cannot and should not)
categorically exclude attention to other perspectives. Although a full
exploration of the relevance of biology to behavioral models, and of
behavioral models to law, is beyond this work's scope, let me offer several
observations nonetheless.
It is the confluence of at least five factors that recommends we consider
biobehavioral perspectives on rape. The first is that law is about regulating
behavior, and a firm grounding in biology is therefore necessary for any
modem, accurate, contextualized, and nuanced understanding of behavior.
power and control, this definition forthrightly shows it to be a serious crime
of violence.
Id.
15. For example, "[i]n some instances, courts have leapt from the fact of difference to the
appropriateness of differential treatment without the benefit of intermediate premises. In
other contexts, physiological distinctions have become cultural imperatives." RHODE, supra
note 4, at 313-20.
16. For one view of this interaction, see, for example, ALLEN, supra note 14, at 118
("clarif[ying] the dynamic of power and subjugation attendant to rape [makes] it difficult to
think of rape as related in any way to sexual desire.").
17. In Texas, for example, one rape defendant charged with twenty-eight counts of rape
claimed he was a victim of 'compulsive rape syndrome,' as a function of high testosterone
levels. See CAROL TAvPIs, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 152, 347 n.41 (1992) (citing
research of William Wilbanks).
18. Substantive changes include, for example, the elimination of demonstrated
nonconsent as an element of the offense. Procedural and evidentiary changes include, for
example, shielding the victim's prior sexual history. See generally Julie Homey & Cassia
Spohn, supra note 5; KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 67-
86 (1996).
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Biobehavioral perspectives on those law-relevant behaviors, such as rape,
that have proved difficult for law to regulate may increase law's
effectiveness. The second factor is the existence of forced copulation in
many other species, recommending that we explore the possibility of
similar origins (in common ancestors or in response to a history of similar
environmental challenges)-just as we do when finding other cross-species
similarities in anatomy, biochemistry, or behavior.
The third factor is that forced copulation in many other species
parallels, in a number of precise and important ways, the patterns of forced
copulation and resistance to forced copulations in humans. The fourth is
that these patterns, in humans and other species, can be parsimoniously
reconciled through the lens of modem behavioral biology, which offers
plausible theoretical foundations that are both mutually consistent and
consistent with other theories presently considered robust. The fifth is that
several of the logic errors commentators often hope to avoid, in order to not
over-interpret biobehavioral theories, have led, in turn, to the commission
of symmetrical logic errors. This suggests that the biobehavioral theories
may have been under-credited.
We explore these five factors in turn.
1. Law, Biology, and Human Behavior
Law is, fundamentally, about regulating human behavior. The better
law's behavioral model-its theory of where behavior comes from-the
better it can identify and anticipate causal relationships between various
environmental conditions and various behavioral outcomes. And the better
law's behavioral model, the better it can estimate how future changes in
law can foster effective pursuit of law-relevant goals. Put another way: the
more legal thinkers understand about the multiple origins of law-relevant
behavior, the better they can design legal systems to regulate it.
Modem brain science has made this logic ever more compelling. It is
elementary that most behavior originates in the brain. The brain, wherein
whatever it is we like to call the mind resides, is an anatomical structure
that processes information collected from the peripheral nerves.
Consequently, like all anatomical structures, its current form and function
necessarily reflect evolutionary processes, such as natural selection and
sexual selection. 19 The implications of this latter conclusion are only now
19. For brief overviews of natural and sexual selection written for a legal audience, see
Part I, A Primer in Law-Relevant Evolutionary Biology, in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117
(1997); Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at 844-50; Timothy H.
Goldsmith & Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior: A Brief Overview and
Some Important Concepts, 39 JURimTIcs 131 (1999). More detailed accounts appear in
TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE: FORGING LINKS
BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 61-65 (1991); JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DOUGLAS J. FUTYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
beginning to be understood and explored in the legal literature.
One implication is that the brain is a specialized, not a general,
information processor. Peripheral nerves do not just carry stimuli to the
brain and dump them on the floor. Different kinds of stimuli are processed
by different parts of the brain, dedicated to different tasks.
Another implication is that this specialized information processor, this
system of organs of computation, has been designed by natural and sexual
selection to solve problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors. In other
words, the brain is overwhelmingly likely to be better at solving certain
kinds of problems than others and to yield states of the nervous system
(commonly called emotions) that, on average, led to adaptive behavior for
our ancestors, in the environments they faced for most of human
evolutionary history.
This means that although individuals vary there are nonetheless certain
species-typical (in some cases sex-typical) 'psychologies'-or information-
processing patterns.20 To the extent patterns of information processing tend
to yield patterns of human behavior, a better understanding of human
evolved psychology can assist law. This is comparatively less useful in the
post-act context (such as a trial) because one can never know for certain
why someone who behaved some way behaved as he or she did. But it is
likely to be quite useful in the pre-act context, such as the development of
society-wide policies for decreasing the likelihood of certain kinds of
behaviors. The better law's model of human behavior, the more efficiently
it may be able to shape environmental conditions to shift behavior in
21socially desirable ways.
(2d ed. 1986); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION
AND HUMAN NATURE (forthcoming 2000); ROBERT T'ivERS, SOCIAL EVOLU7ION (1985);
J.R. KREBS & N.B. DAVIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY (3d ed. 1993);
MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (1993); MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION,
AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); SCOTT FREEMAN & JON C. HERRON, EVOLUTIONARY
ANAL YSIS (1998); DAVID M. Buss, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEv SCIENCE OF THE
MIND (1999).
20. Extending the term 'psychology' into the non-human context may at first appear to
overstate the case. As the term is typically used in the animal behavior context, however,
the 'psychology' of non-human animals refers not to cognitive processes or consciousness,
but rather to the behavior-influencing patterns of information processing, performed in some
relatively simple brain, that are typical of a species and that guide its members toward
reproductively useful activities. Such species-typical psychologies are subject to
evolutionary processes when differences between heritable psychological mechanisms yield
differences in reproductive success of the organisms bearing them. Those psychological
traits tending to increase their own replication into future generations tend to appear in
larger and larger proportions of ensuing generations, until some extremely successful traits
become shared throughout the entire population, or some subportion of it (such as males or
females).
21. Just as meteorology is useful, notwithstanding its inability to predict the appearance
or movement of a single cloud, behavioral biology can give us a window on behavior likely
to emerge from somewhere, given certain environmental conditions, even if we cannot
predict from whom. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of
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2. Rape in Other Species
A second factor recommending the significance of biology to
understanding rape is that forced copulation is by no means a uniquely
human phenomenon. The behavior is widely documented, in both wild and
laboratory conditions, in species ranging from our closest primate relatives
(including orangutans, chimpanzees, and gorillas 22) to more distant
primates, other mammals, birds, and insects.23 Typically, the existence of
common behaviors between humans and other creatures (such as sexual
desire, care of offspring, and the like), just as the existence of common
structures (opposable thumbs, four limbs, and the like), recommends the
consideration of common origins. The presumption of common origins,
easily rebutted with proper evidence, is consistent with a scientific
approach and provides a useful starting point.
Of course, it is a point of some debate whether or not forced copulation
in non-human species can properly be called 'rape.' For there are
obviously many additional layers of meaning, beyond forced copulation
alone, surrounding 'rape' in humans. The issue has been debated at some
length elsewhere, and I will here use the term rape simply as a short
synonym for forced copulation.24
3. Parallel Rape Patterns Between Other Species and Humans
In addition to the mere fact that males of many species besides humans
force copulations, it is significant that the patterns in which rape occurs in
humans are often strildngly similar to the patterns of rape behavior in the
other animal species in which rape occurs.25
For example, just as forced copulations are non-randomly distributed in
Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1047 (1989)
("meteorology is (another] example of the value of even uncertain predictions.").
22. See generally RICHARD WRANGHAM & DALE PETERSON, DEMONIC MALES: APES AND
THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 132-43 (1996).
23. See generally sources cited in Jones, Sex Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra
note 7, at 936, Appendix A; and notes 104-12.
24. Craig Palmer reviews some of this debate in Craig T. Palmer, Rape in Nonhuman
Animal Species: Definitions, Evidence, and Implications, 26 J. SEx RES. 355 (1989). For the
view that 'rape' can refer to forced copulation in both humans and other animals, see, for
example, Charles Crawford & Birute M. F. Galdikas, Rape in Non-Human Animals: An
Evolutionary Perspective, 27 CAN. PSYCHOL. 215 (1986). Opposing views can be found in
Daniel Q. Estep & Katherine E. M. Bruce, The Concept of Rape in Non-Humans: A
Critique, 29 ANIMAL BEHAv. 1272 (1981); Donald F. J. Hilton, Is It Really Rape or Forced
Copulation? 32 BIOSCI. 641 (1982); PHIuIP KrrCHER, VAULTING AMnTON: SOCIOBIOLOGY
AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE 184-89 (1985) and sources cited in RANDY THORNHILL
& CRAIG J. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL
COERCION 120 (2000). (This latter title reflects a prepublication title change from the prior
title, to which I referred in Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7: WHY
MEN RAPE, WHY WOMEN SUFFER: RAPE, EVOLUTION, AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.) See also
Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at n.85.
25. See generally, Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7 (surveying
studies on rape patterns).
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other species, and overwhelmingly concentrated on reproductive females,26
the victims of human rapes appear to be overwhelmingly concentrated into
those age groups in which females are likely to be reproductive. 27
Moreover, the patterns of psychological trauma in victimized females and
females fearing rape appear to be sufficiently narrowly tailored, and so
broadly consistent with patterns of rape avoidance in other species, that it
suggests both that there are evolutionary origins to rape avoidance
mechanisms and that forced copulation has long been a significant threat in
28human ancestry. Although the details of the relevant evolved algorithm
vary from species to species, as one would expect, the presence of forced
copulation in so many species in addition to our own, including in species
without what we think of as culture, society, or symbolic reasoning,
suggests the possibility that similarly evolved psychological mechanisms
contribute to observable patterns of sexual aggression in humans.
4. Theoretical Foundation for Biobehavioral Influences on Rape
In addition to the empirical evidence concerning rape in humans and
non-humans, there is a quite plausible theoretical foundation, explored in
numerous biological works, for the biobehavioral influences on sexual
aggression that could explain those patterns. An evolutionary perspective
on rape behavior, at the theoretical level, considers the extent to which
evolved psychological adaptations are relevant to the incidence of rape.
26. See id. at 865-67 (discussing data).
27. See Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Human Rape: The Strengths of the
Evolutionary Perspective, in PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND
APPLICATIONS (Crawford et al. eds., 1987); Randy Thornhill, Is There Psychological
Adaptation to Rape?, 16 ANALYSE & KRITIK 68 (1994); Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen
Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men's Coercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Sci. 363 (1992) (article followed by extensive peer commentary); Randy Thornhill & Nancy
Wilmsen Thomhill, Coercive Sexuality of Men: Is There Psychological Adaptation to
Rape? in SEXUAL COERCION 91, 103 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds.,
1991); Randy Thornhill et al., The Biology of Rape, in RAPE 102, 117-18 (S. Tomaseli & R.
Porter eds., 1986).
28. See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 24; Randy Thornhill, Rape-Victim
Psychological Pain Revisited, in HUMAN NATURE 239 (Laura Betzig ed., 1997); Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill, Psychological Adaptation to Sexual Coercion in Victims and Offenders,
in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 90 (David Buss &
Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An
Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain Following Human (Homo sapiens) Rape: IV.
The Effect of the Nature of the Sexual Assault, 105 J. COMP. PSYCHOL 343 (1991); Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain
Following Rape. II." Effects of Force and Violence, 16 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 297 (1990);
Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological
Pain Following Rape. 11: Effects of Stranger, Friend, and Family-Member Offenders, 11
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 177 (1990); Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An
Evolutionary Analysis of Psychological Pain Following Rape. I: The Effects of Victim's Age
and Marital Status, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 155 (1990); Randy Thornhill & Nancy
Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolution of Psychological Pain, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 73 (Robert W. Bell & Nancy J. Bell eds., 1989).
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This may be either because there is an evolved male psychology tending to
increase the probability of sexual coercion in response to various patterns
of environmental stimuli (the 'adaptation' hypothesis), or because sexual
coercion is an incidental effect of other psychological adaptations (the 'by-
product' hypothesis).29
There are two things of note. First, it is important to recognize that
biological theories of human behavior are not simply genetic theories of
human behavior. (Nor are they, of course, either normatively justifying or
excusing.) Behavioral biology studies the intersection of genetic influences
of behavior (through genetic influences on brain development and
operation) with environmental influences on behavior (through
environmental influences on brain development and operation). The
specific relationship between genetic influences and environmental
influences can be discerned in the light of evolutionary processes,
particularly natural and sexual selection.
Second, behavior can be influenced by evolved psychologies in ways
that are facultative (or, if one prefers, 'condition-dependent,'
'environmentally sensitive,' or 'context-specific'). A brief example will
illustrate the importance of this principle.
a. The Power of Evolved Facultative Behavior
The male scorpionfly is a distinctive creature, looking something like a
cross between a wasp and a scorpion. It's greatest distinction, however, is
its behavior. Some of the males, on occasion, grab a female, attempt to
immobilize her, and attempt to inseminate her by overpowering her
struggles to depart uninseminated (which she nonetheless does roughly
60% of the time). Her lack of enthusiasm for copulation, in this context, is
inferred from contrasting these encounters with the far more statistically
frequent and routinely sperm-transferring kind of copulation, in which the
female manifests no similarly uncooperative behavior.
Beneath this apparently sexually aggressive scenario lurks something
even more intriguing. If a male scorpionfly can obtain and defend a dead
insect, such as a grasshopper, it is often successful in attracting a willing
sex partner. Females like to eat dead insects, and they are sexually
attracted to a male that has one. If a male either cannot obtain a dead
insect, or is relieved of his insect by a larger or more vigorous male, he will
often attempt to create a suitably nutritious substitute: a small mound of his
own saliva. Females apparently prefer dead insects, when they can get
them, but a salivary mass is often an acceptable substitute.
Nonetheless, some males can offer neither insect nor salivary mound,
either because they were unable to procure or produce an attractive one, or
29. See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 24. See also Randy Thornhill, The Biology of
Human Rape, 39 JuluMETRics 137 (1999); Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape,
supra note 7, at 854-57.
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because they were displaced by a stronger male who then courts females
using those offerings as his own. It is typically the male unsuccessful in
routine courtship that then attempts to force copulation with a female.
Lacking insect or adequate substitute, he nonetheless carries, like all male
scorpionflies, an anatomical clamp used to pin a struggling female's wing
long enough for him to inseminate her-to force copulation. The clamp
appears to have no other purpose. Disable the clamp, experimentally, and
the male cannot succeed in copulating with a female.
30
b. From Insects to Humans, and Other Apparent Leaps of Logic
What if anything, could this mean? It would be foolish to over
interpret this. Humans are not insects. They have no special anatomical
features used only in forced copulations. And plenty of rapists are not
sexually desperate.31  Nevertheless, biologists maintain that there is
something important to be learned from scorpionfly behavior about the
evolutionary processes that can give rise to sexual aggression.
Specifically, the scorpionfly is living evidence that a conditional
psychological algorithm, which increases the likelihood of sexual
aggression in specific circumstances, can evolve by natural processes. For
should a previously occupied salivary mass become available, a previously
raping male will quickly switch strategies, claiming the mass, engaging in
typical courtship behavior, and attempting to attract willing sex partners.
Moreover, should a dead insect then become available, that same male will
switch strategies once again, claiming the insect, engaging in typical
courtship behavior, and attempting to attract willing sex partners.
What this means is that the difference between being a courtly
scorpionfly and a raping scorpionfly is a function of the environmental
conditions a single male scorpionfly may encounter. Put another way,
rather than finding one predisposition to court females with insect food,
one predisposition to court females with saliva, and one predisposition to
force copulation-we find evidence of a single, constantly cycling
conditional predisposition: "If in possession of dead insect, court; if no
insect, spit and court; if no success, attempt rape; repeat."
Unless male scorpionflies are uniformly learning this sequence of
behavior from other scorpionflies, or independently deducing it-things
that no one currently suggests-then every male bears this inherent,
genetically influenced 'psychology' that predisposes him to one kind of
behavior or another, depending on circumstances. This unequivocally
30. For discussion of these phenomena, see Randy Thornhill, Rape in Panorpa
Scorpionflies and a General Rape Hypothesis, 28 ANIMAL BEHAv. 52 (1980). A useful
summary of the experiment appears in JoHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN
EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE (5th ed. 1993), at 418-19.
31. Martin L. Lalumiere et al., A Test of the Mate Deprivation Hypothesis of Sexual
Coercion, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 299 (1996); L.E. Stermac & V.L. Quinsey,
Social Competence Among Rapists, 8 BEHAV. ASSESSMENT 171 (1986).
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demonstrates that even in simple, tiny brains, evolutionary processes can
create relatively complex condition-dependent information processing
patterns that narrowly tailor behavior to precise environmental conditions.
The implication is that similarly context-specific algorithms could
influence similar behaviors in humans-even while humans are subject to
far more complicated combinations of cultural, learned, and other
environmental variables. And biologists and psychologists increasingly
maintain that this is plausible.
5. The Symmetry of Logic Errors
The fifth factor that, in combination with the others explored above
suggests that biobehavioral theories of rape are worth studying, concerns
the dangers of over-avoiding certain kinds of logic errors. There is a
tendency to see many significant logic errors as single rather than paired.
Three examples suffice to make this clear.
First, it is frequently noted by those resisting biological perspectives
that one cannot legitimately reason from the descriptive to the normative.
That is, we recognize that saying that something is so is very different from
saying that something ought to be so. To reason directly from 'is' to
'ought' is to commit the well-known "Naturalistic Fallacy."3 2 Yet there is
a symmetrical logic error, frequently overlooked, that is equally invalid.
Charles Crawford has termed this the "Moralistic Fallacy," and one
commits it when assuming that what ought to be is what is.33 Here, reality
is somehow expected to conform to one's normative preference for the way
reality best would be. Though the Naturalistic Fallacy receives most
attention, the Moralistic Fallacy is equally likely to lead us from sound
conclusions. And popular cautions to not let norms follow facts are
hazardous if they allow us to assert, too blithely, that facts follow
preferences. Thus, while it would obviously be unsound to conclude that
rape is acceptable simply because other species rape too, it is equally
invalid to conclude that there are no biobehavioral influences on rape,
simply because it may be offensive or undesirable that there be such
influences.
Second, commentators concerned at the possible consequences of
mistakenly admitting biobehavioral influences on rape have typically
32. The term was coined by G.E. Moore in PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Thomas Baldwin ed., 2d
ed. 1993), at 62, 89-110, but the concept traces to the 1888 edition of DAVID A. HUME,
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978).
See also Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at 893-95.
33. See also Charles Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the Study of Human
Behaviour: An Introduction and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 9 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998);
Charles Crawford, Book Review, 20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAv. 137, 139 (1999)
(reviewing UNrING PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY: INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (Nancy Segal et al. eds., 1997)).
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under-examined the consequences of mistakenly denying biobehavioral
influences on rape. Either there are such influences or there are not, and
their existence, if any, must be amenable to the inquiries of science. But
one cannot validly assume that it would be more costly to believe that there
are biobehavioral influences on rape, if in fact there are none, than it would
be to believe that there are not biobehavioral influences on rape, if in fact
there are. Appropriate concern for the costs of being mistaken must take
account of both types of errors.
Third, critics of biobehavioral theories of human behavior often fault
researchers for attempting to draw meaningful analogies between the
behavior of humans and that of other animals. To do so is to engage in
anthropomorphism. Again, this sin has a twin: anthropodenial. 34  If
anthropomorphism is the overextension of commonalities of causation on
human and non-human behavior, then anthropodenial is the under-
recognition of commonalities of causation. Both errors can foster unsound
conclusions. Human self-consciousness and cognitive capacities foster
grand abilities in the realms of analysis, decisionmaking, and symbolic
manipulation. But the addition of those abilities to our species' behavioral
repertoire cannot fully eclipse the evolutionary past, or render us exempt
from biobehavioral influences (any more than the addition to a building of
its 20th story harbor-view thereby makes its foundation and ground floor
irrelevant).
These reasons briefly summarized, as well as a number explored in
other works on the subject of biobehavioral perspectives on rape,
recommend serious consideration of biology in the study of rape. It is
possible that none, alone, would be considered sufficient. But it is difficult
to maintain that biology is irrelevant to human rape in the face of their
confluence. To the extent that legal thinkers are charged with reducing the
incidence of rape, they would be well advised to learn more behavioral
biology (and there are now a great many accessible sources that offer
assistance in that regard). 35 Assuming legal thinkers were inclined to do so,
the Parts that follow below explore several important aspects of that
endeavor.
34. See Frans de Waal, Are We in Anthropodenial?, DISCOVER, Jul. 1997, at 50.
35. See sources cited supra note 19. For popular and accessible explanations of
behavioral biology and evolutionary psychology, see MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX
AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1994); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL:
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
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II. CLARIFYING TERMS: ON AVOIDING FRUITLESS
DEBATE
A. THE FOUNT OF CONFUSION
One of the most significant barriers to integrating life sciences and
social science perspectives on rape concerns misunderstandings born of
36definitional ambiguities. One way to illustrate this is with reference to
the oft-encountered phrase "Rape is about violence, not sex. '37 See Figure
1.
I raise this example not to caricature non-biological theories of rape,
for there are many such theories, and much utility in some. And while this
slogan emerged from early feminist activism on rape issues, it is clear that
the present multitude of feminist perspectives on rape cannot be fairly
represented by any one slogan, let alone this one.38 I want to explore
definitional ambiguities through use of this particular phrase, instead, for
two reasons.
First, the phrase has permeated the public, educational, and legal arenas
to a degree that many alternative, and perhaps more subtle and accurate
feminist perspectives have not.39 Second, many of the ambiguities this
phrase reveals can be generalized to other contexts, divorced of this slogan
itself, in which they still operate to cloud interdisciplinary discourse.
36. For a recent discussion of situational ambiguities in the context of alleged sexual
coercion, see Katherine Baker, Text, Context, and the Problem with Rape, 28 Sw. L.J. 297
(1999).
37. See Mary Ann Largen, The Anti-Rape Movement: Past and Present, in RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 1, 5 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1985). This
formulation would later "prove to be an effective tool for changing public attitudes about the
nature of the crime itself." Id.
A reader may equally substitute 'power,' 'hostility,' 'aggression,' and the like, for
'violence,' if he or she prefers.
38. See generally Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Is Rape Sex or Violence? Conceptual
Issues and Implications, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 119, 119-20 (David Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996) ("A simplistic
answer to the question-Is rape sex or violence?-would be that nonfeminists view rape as
sex, whereas feminists view rape as violence.... As N'e show, however, this simplistic
answer is incorrect. Both feminists and nonfeminists have taken a variety of positions on
this question. Furthermore, neither a 'rape is sex' nor a 'rape is violence' position has solely
positive or negative implications for rape victims or for all women."). See also Jones, Sex,
Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at 829-41.
39. One measure of its permeation is its frequent, typically unsupported, appearance in
popular rape education materials. See, for example, RAPE PREVENTION EDUCATION
PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, RESOURCES AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT
(undated brochure on file with author), wherein this statement appears, on page three: "Fact:
Sexual assault is an act of physical and emotional violence, not of sexual gratification." See
also ARIZONA STATE UNIvERsrrY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SAFETY AT
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSrY (Sept. 1, 1998) (flyer on file with author), wherein this
statement appears, on page two: 'These ideas assume that sexual assault is a sexual crime--
a crime that is motivated by desire. It is not. It is a violent crime, a hostile attack intended
to hurt and to humiliate. Sex is the weapon."
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Consider the constituent words in sequence, and how the many eminently
supportable but alternative meanings of them can reduce otherwise
constructive dialogue about rape to a hopeless tangle of misunderstandings.
Figure 1. Definitional Ambiguities












Penis; Tongue; Digits; or Objects
into






A sexual experience (Victim)
The term 'rape' can refer to at least four different combinations of
perpetrator and victim sex: 1) male-female; 2) male-male; 3) female-male;
and 4) female-female. Although it is not inconceivable that different
people may have different theories for why these different combinations of
violence may arise, one often sees one theory attacked because it fails to
explain what it does not purport to explain. That is, a theory may be
deemed faulty because it does not explain all of these perpetrator-victim
combinations of sexual aggression, and someone else thinks it must do so
to be a good theory.4°
Moreover, depending on jurisdiction, and whom you ask, 'rape' can
refer to very different acts, such as the penile penetration of a vagina, on
one hand, or something more, such as the insertion of objects into an anus,
on the other. The nature of what is inserted (penis? tongue? digits?
objects?), the precise orifice into which it is inserted (mouth? vagina?
anus?), and even the ages of the individuals involved (adults? minors? one
40. One frequently sees this in the confused attempt by some to suggest that the very





and the other?) are all variables relevant to the different meanings people
ascribe to 'rape.' 41 Here, again, different theories may explain different
subsets of these phenomena, and not others. At the same time, those
seeking a unified theory that applies generally to all contexts may find such
theories unpersuasive. Although a well-defined discussion could be had
addressing the higher-order issue of how generalizable a theory of rape or
sexual aggression would likely need to be to be true, it is in fact rare that
discussants ensure that they are talking about precisely the same things, and
that the scope of 'rape' for a given conversation is clearly delineated,
before jumping in to criticize each other.
The word 'is' (in "rape is about violence"), too, has multiple meanings.
When someone makes a statement that rape 'is' something it is often
unclear whether the speaker offers the statement as a claim about factual,
objective truth (as in "The boiling point of water is 100 degrees Celsius"),
as an expression of opinion (as in "That music is horrible"), or as an
expression of what one wants to be true (as in "New York is going to win
this game"). 42 Which 'is' it is defines acceptable bases for rebuttal, and
discussants' divergent assumptions about the meaning of 'is' intended by
another often yield thoroughly wasted arguments. Such divergences are
particularly likely between social scientists and life scientists, since each
set of disciplines has rather different views of methods by which an 'is' can
be revealed, and the permanence or impermanence, objectivity or
subjectivity, of the reality they attempt to discover and describe with 'is'
statements.
Even more confusingly, the vagueness of 'is' raises an expressio unius
est exclusio alterius interpretational problem. When someone says that
rape is x, can one properly infer that he or she means that rape is x--and
nothing more? Or is it implicit in 'is' that something can be many things at
once? For example, the assertion that "rape is about violence" might mean,
among other things, that rape is:
a) about violence, and only about violence;
b) about violence on balance (i.e., at least 51%), but also about
something else, such as sex;
c) predominantly about violence (e.g., 75%), but also about something
41. For thoughtful explorations of the definitional issues, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, A
Theory of Rape, in A MOST DETABLE CRIME: NEw PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 92
(Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999); Muehlenhard, supra note 38. "The question-'Is rape
sex or violence?'-depends on how rape, sex, and violence are defined and conceptualized."
Id. at 124. A useful discussion of some of the definitional issues also appears in Patricia A.
Harney & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, Rape, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS
NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 3, 3-6 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski
eds., 1991).
42. See, e.g., Ken Plummer, The Social Uses of Sexuality: Symbolic Interaction, Power
and Rape, in PERSPECTIVES ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 37, 42 (June Hopkins ed., 1984)
("Rape is not the unleashing of male desire; it is rather the articulation of male meaning.").
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else; or
d) overwhelmingly about violence (e.g., 98% violence), but also about
something else.
Unelaborated, 'is' can describe anything from a trivial component of
reality to an exclusive statement that purports to occupy the ontological
field.43
'About' yields a somewhat different problem. Claiming that rape is
'about' violence can refer either to cause, on one hand, or to effect and
meaning, on the other. When such a claim refers to the underlying causes
of rape, it is presumably a statement that something about violence (or
power or hostility or aggression) causes the rapist to rape. Presumably, this
is not intended to suggest that the rapist is not responsible for his actions,
and we may therefore infer, on this line of interpretation, that an advocate
of this view intends to indicate that the desire to do violence is an aspect of
perpetrator motivation. The nature and boundaries of that aspect are
unclear, as are, often, the deductive steps necessary to make the empirical
claim.
If, instead, the term 'about' refers not to the cause of rape, but to its
meaning, the question then becomes: "to whom?" Is the phrase "rape is
about violence, not sex" then about the social meaning of rape, the meaning
of rape to the victim, the meaning of rape to unraped but fearful females,
the meaning of rape to the rapist, the meaning of rape to the victim's
friends and family, the meaning of rape to some supposedly objective third
party-or something else entirely? 44
The remaining words in the phrase "rape is about violence, not sex" are
common to many discussions about rape and yet similarly protean.
Understanding the scope of 'violence,' for example, typically requires
reference to shifting social mores, legal meanings, and contexts. The
meaning can vary as a function of the degree of harm inflicted and the
amount of harm intended. It can also vary by the kind of harm, depending
on the extent to which emotional as well as physical harm can be
43. Unelaborated, 'is' can apparently also make non-sex of prior sex. Hear, e.g.,
Videotaped Grand Jury Testimony of William J. Clinton, Aug. 17, 1998, excerpted at The
President's Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 5428181
("It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is.").
44. See Muehlenhard, supra note 38, at 120 ("Furthermore... the meaning of the
question-'Is rape sex or violence?'-is ambiguous. It could refer to motivation, to
consequences, or to how one experiences, conceptualizes, and labels the experience."). See
also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, reprinted in RAPE &
SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 28 (Patricia Searles & Ronald L
Berger eds., 1995) (raising the 'from whose point of view' issue); Barry Burkhart & Mary
Ellen Fromuth, Individual Psychological and Social Psychological Understandings of
Sexual Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION 75, 76 (E. Grauerholz & M.A. Koralewski eds.,
1991) (noting that "researchers tend not only to be separated by their different disciplinary
contexts but also by their research focus on either victim or perpetrator, with relatively few
researchers investigating both.").
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considered violent.
'Not' is generally vague in this context simply because of the many
degrees of not-ness. The word, in context, could mean "not at all."
Alternatively, it could mean some variation of "generally not," such as "not
at base," "not primarily," "not really," or "not, on average." Implicit in the
use of 'not' is the existence of some threshold of contrary evidence at
which the use of 'not' would become inappropriate. But it is unclear what
amount of sex, for example, would be necessary to meet that threshold, and
make the statement that "rape is about violence, not sex" false.
Of course, the term 'sex,' generally, could mean sexual desire (of the
perpetrator) or a sexual experience (for the victim). In various contexts
'sex' can mean copulation, non-copulatory stimulation of one or more
sexual organs, a meaningful and pleasurable exchange of bodily sensations
between consenting adults, and other things besides. (Is phone sex sex?) If
the meaning of 'sex' in the phrase "rape is about violence, not sex" is
copulation, nothing more, then arguing that a forced copulation is violence,
not copulation, is confusingly meaningless. If sex refers to meaningful and
pleasurable exchange between consenting adults, then arguing, for
example, that forced copulation is not un-forced copulation is similarly
meaningless. It is increasingly obvious that at least to the extent that sex is
meant to refer to a sexual experience of the victim, rape is not sex. What
remains more controversial, and difficult to explore, is whether or not,
notwithstanding that rape is not sexual for the victim, rape may be sexual
for the perpetrator.
Of course, this deconstructive, interpretive exercise risks so atomizing
the meaning of words in a common phrase that a whole that once exceeded
the sum of its parts is reduced only to parts. Nevertheless, if we were to
assume, quite conservatively, that each word in this short phrase had only
four meanings, no more, that would leave us with a bewildering 4096
possible meanings. This is surely many orders of magnitude beneath the
number of meanings to which this phrase alone is legitimately susceptible.
And similar ambiguities infuse other discussions of and claims about rape.
This is particularly true when discussants shout across the social
science-life science divide, for vocabularies and meanings are even more
unfamiliar, and assumptions about them often more incorrect. And it is
evident that most of the time the subject of biobehavioral influences on
rape arises, discussants from different disciplines are vehemently pressing,
denying, or defending intellectual ground, the contours of which are
unimagined and unintended by their opposite numbers. And it is therefore
not surprising that interdisciplinary discussions have often been
acrimonious, confusing, and unproductive.
45
45. In 1983, for example, Professor Delbert D. Thiessen was invited to give a Fellow's
Address at the meeting of the Division for Comparative and Physiological Psychology at the
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B. WHAT BIOBEHAVIORAL THEORIES ADDRESS
Because failing to clarify vocabulary yields instant misunderstandings
of scope and meaning, it is always important that rape scholars and
discussants carefully describe what they do and do not mean. This is
particularly true in the context of discussing biobehavioral theories of
sexual aggression, because the content and methods of biology, particularly
behavioral biology, are sufficiently unfamiliar to most commentators that
misimpressions are exceedingly probable. In particular, those exploring
biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression generally see themselves as
attempting to explain one set of behaviors-males forcing copulation on
females unwilling to copulate with them-while critics often fault those
theories for not explaining what the critics see as the entire set of behaviors
that should be explained by one unified theory.46
One cannot logically challenge a scientific theory by simply pointing
out that it does not explain things that it does not purport to explain. The
more socially malleable the scope and definition of the behavior in question
is, the more carefully one must respect the definitional limits defined by the
theories themselves.
A theory that purports to explain one phenomenon is not invalid,
without more, simply because it fails to explain all phenomena. Although
it is important that all theories deemed reliable be consistent with each
other, in the end, it is also important to consider that different phenomena
have different causes. And if one is concerned at the over-application of
this principle-at the thought that, for example, wily scientists will get
away with defining too small a piece of the rape puzzle-one must also
recognize that they risk doing so at the proper price of triviality and
irrelevance. If the phenomenon of rape is as complex and diverse as it
appears to be, even modest contributions toward understanding a subset of
rape behavior will be useful.
annual convention of the American Psychological Association. He entitled his talk Rape as
a Reproductive Strategy: Our Evolutionary Legacy. In advance of the talk, several critics
charged that the title, as publicized, was offensive-in that it suggested that rape was an
acceptable method for procreating. Hostile reaction inspired a small book from the critics:
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF RAPE (Suzanne R.
Sunday & Ethel Tobach eds., 1985) in which some history of this episode is recounted. In
my view, this unfortunate incident is traceable, in large part, to the cross-disciplinary
ambiguity of the term of art "reproductive strategy" which has a normative implication in
lay minds, and no such implication to evolutionists. See, e.g., Julie Blackman, The
Language of Sexual Violence: More Than a Matter of Semantics, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, supra, at 115, 126 ("Strategies and legacies are connotatively positive.").
46. Actually, the matter is often far more complicated, because critics often apply a
higher standard to biobehavioral theories than they do to their own theory, which they often
readily acknowledge does not explain every instance of sexual aggression; but that is not
relevant here.
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Ill. DIVIDING THEORY FROM THEORY: ON THE REALMS
OF MEANING AND CAUSE
There is a famous optical illusion of a line-drawn cube of uncertain
orientation. As the mind attempts to interpret the two dimensional image
into three dimensional space, the cube appears to protrude first to one side,
and then to the other. The very same data are susceptible of two very
different, equally coherent, interpretations.
A great deal of academic scholarship, legal and otherwise, functions as
if to fix in the reader's mind one view of a cube-to persuasively argue that
an entire constellation of existing and perceived data points are better
interpreted from one perspective than another.47 'Better,' here, is often
implicitly defined with reference to a supplied value, such as economic
efficiency, morality, consistency, distributive fairness, retribution,
deterrence, group welfare maximization, and the like.
On few topics, of course, has the struggle over the view of a cube been
more fully joined than on rape. And the extent to which biology provides
any useful information about multiple origins of sexual aggression has been
a common point of debate. This Part, and the one that follows, propose a
way in which the right sequence and balance of perspectival division and
integration can allow us to maintain two simultaneous views of the cube.
These vindicate popular theories, improve law's behavioral model of rape,
and inject insights from biobehavioral science into the mix.
A. Two VIEWS OF THE CUBE
In common parlance, to have a view of a cube, a set of data, is to have
a 'theory.' Thus, we speak freely of a theory of justice, a theory of
punishment, a theory of government, or a lawyer's theory of the case.
Theory means different things in these different contexts. But by and large
to have a 'theory' in law (as well as in many social sciences that inform
law) is to present a plausible opinion, a useful perspective, or both.
Typically, such theories present ways to understand the complex inter-
relationship of ideas, meanings, events, and consequences. And upon the
foundation of such theories the legal system attempts to build socially
important and effective approaches to regulating law-relevant behavior.
In this sense, one can say that each main feature of law reflects some
theory. This is certainly true in the context of rape. Most early rape
theorists, for example, were psychiatrists, and from their perspective rape
reflected mental illness. Consequently, the laws of no less than thirty states
at one time gave form to this theory of rapists as sick deviants and sexual
psychopaths. They defined a rapist as, for example, "a person unable to
47. The biologist Richard Dawkins has invoked the Necker Cube metaphor in a different
context. See RiCHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE: THE LONG REACH OF THE
GENE (1999).
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control his sexual impulse or having to commit sex crimes. 48
The later ascendancy of feminist and sociological perspectives on rape,
beginning in the 1970s and extending through modem day, largely replaced
the psychiatric view of rape. From the perspective of these disciplines,
rape is something normal people may do when they have been socialized,
acculturated, and trained to rape. Here, rape is viewed as a function of
social traditions, gender roles, and cultural determination, as well as
patriarchy, dominance, and violence. Again, law followed suit. The
federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was one example of a
statute giving form to the theory that the violence of rape is akin to the
violence of the 'hate' crimes that involve, for instance, gay-bashing and
racially-motivated violence.
49
There is, of course, another set of academic disciplines in which
'theory' has a more narrowly defmed meaning, and in which theories of
rape are also explored. In the sciences, to have a theory is to have a
parsimonious explanation of observable phenomena, from the premises of
which falsifiable predictions can be derived and tested. Good theories
survive efforts at falsification. Moreover, new theories are judged against
the backdrop of other theories. In the end, all must reconcile. So a new
theory must either be consistent with previously accepted theories or
initiate their reformulation. In the same way that we could not long tolerate
a theory of chemistry inconsistent with a robust theory of physics, scientists
are loathe to maintain any theory of behavior that depends on principles
inconsistent with current theories of biological evolution-both
morphological and behavioral.
Rape scholars get into trouble, it seems, when they fail to adequately
distinguish between these two very different meanings of theory-either
when proposing one or critiquing one. Consequently, a critical feature in
the transition toward models of rape that integrate social science
knowledge with life science knowledge is to be able to make such
distinctions.
B. OF MEANINGS AND MOTIVES, CAUSES AND CORRELATIONS
One way to divide theory from theory in a useful and systematic way is
to recognize the distinction between what we might call the realm of
meaning and the realm of cause. Recognizing these as two equally
48. DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONVICTED
RAPISTS 35 (1990) (citing Karl M. Bowman & Bernice Engle, Sexual Psychopath Laws, in
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 757 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965)).
49. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40111(a)-40611, 108 Stat. 1796, 1903-53 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). For discussion, see Jones, Sex,
Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 7, at 835, 921-25. As this article went to press,
the civil remedy provision of VAWA was invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 2000
WL 574361 (May 15, 2000), affg Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ.,
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
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important views of the cube will contribute toward more rational
discussion, a richer understanding of rape, and possibly increased
effectiveness in law's ability to deter it.
I propose this not because meanings and causes are mutually exclusive,
but because even when perspectives on them overlap they nonetheless
represent fundamentally different kinds of inquiries. This is, though not an
earth-shattering insight, one that has been surprisingly neglected in the rape
literature itself. For it is remarkably common for scholars to make
assumptions that actual effects of rape are intended effects of rape, and that
the meanings of rape reveal the actual motives of rape. Because correlation
is not causation, however, there need be no automatic connection between
the effect of an act and the reason for doing it.
There are two principle advantages of dividing theory from theory in a
way that recognizes the distinctions between cause and meaning. First,
such a distinction allows researchers more freedom to pursue the subject of
their own domain, unharassed by critics from the other. Second, such a
division, which echoes the 'ought'-'is' distinction, most closely matches
the product of different rape scholars with the aspect of legal process in
greatest need of that product.
Rape and the Realm of Meaning. It is typically from the realm of
meaning that law receives direction and social goals to pursue. For it is in
the normative and interpretive arena that one answers such questions as:
What does it mean to live in a society in which rape occurs? Is rape a good
thing or a bad thing, and why? How important is it that we act to prevent
rape? Law would be agnostic on the causes of rape, were it not for the
meanings of its effects, and the effects of its meanings. There are historical,
political, social, feminist, and moral dimensions to rape, among others.
Each offers important contributions to public and private understandings
and reactions to the phenomenon. Consequently, it is in the realm of
meaning that the significance of rape, and the extent of its harms, are
perceived, processed, and assessed.
Rape and the Realm of Cause. For some disciplines, it is sufficient to
study only the meanings of rape. Law is not one of these. Meanings may
affect law's goals, but optimally effective paths toward reaching those
goals typically require an accurate understanding of the things that
influence the probability of the behavior in question. Consequently, law
must attend as closely to cause as to meaning.
IV. DIVIDING CAUSE FROM CAUSE: ON PROXIMATE AND
ULTIMATE INFLUENCES
Dividing views of rape into two main perspectives-those from the
realm of meaning and those from the realm of cause-is alone insufficient
to further the complete transition from prior behavioral models on rape to
those that incorporate biobehavioral perspectives. The next step toward
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transition requires the subdivision of causes into two kinds. Biologists
term these "proximate" and "ultimate" causes, respectively.5 °
A. PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE CAUSES
All behavior can be understood to be the result of these immediate
(proximate) and evolutionary (ultimate) causes. Proximate causes involve
physiology and biochemistry as well as an organism's unique
developmental history. Ultimate causes involve the history and
reproductive consequences of behavior, viewed in evolutionary time.
This classic example will clarify. Proximate causes of a male bird's
spring singing include the hormonal changes triggered by the lengthening
of successive days, the activation of particular motor neurons to the vocal
apparatus, and each bird's individual experience of songs heard and songs
practiced. Ultimate causes of the same bird's spring singing address the
"purposes" of singing-claiming territory, advertising genetic fitness, and
attracting mates-all of which contribute to reproductive success and have
thus been favored by natural and sexual selection. Explanations of ultimate
cause are thus hypotheses about selective advantage of one behavior
relative to another. And the ultimate causation lens helps explain why it
was more probable that the lengthening days of spring, rather than the
shortening days of fall, would lead to singing-as well as why lengthening
days lead to singing, rather than to some alternative behavior disconnected
from mating success.
The principal advantages of conceptualizing behavior as the product of
both proximate and ultimate causes is this. In some circumstances it
prevents people from arguing about whether this or that causes a behavior,
when in part both do. Just as it is apparent that neither genes nor
50. On proximate and ultimate causation generally, see JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL
BEHAVIOR 3-7 (6th ed. 1998); TIMOT-Y H. GOLDSMITH, THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HuNiAN
NATURE: FORGING LINKS BETWEEN EvOLuTION AND BEHAVIOR 3-11, 46-69 (1991); John
Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Utility of the Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96
ETHOLOGY 58 (1994); Owen D. Jones, Genes, Behavior, and Law, 15 POL. & LIFE SCI. 101
(1996); Goldsmith & Jones, supra note 19; Bobbi S. Low, Human Sex Differences in
Behavioral Ecological Perspective, 16 ANALYSE & KRITIK 38, 40-42 (1994). As Nancy
Thornhill stated:
Proximate explanations for the existence of adaptations focus on genetic,
biochemical, physiological, developmental, social, and all other immediate
causes leading to the expression of adaptations. Ultimate explanations of
adaptation have their theoretical foundation in causes that operated during
evolutionary history to lead to adaptation.... Proximate and evolutionary
explanations of causation do not conflict. Both proximate and ultimate
explanations are needed for complete understanding of adaptations. By
understanding the evolutionary purpose of an adaptation, one should be able
successfully to predict and understand the proximate causes that affect the
expression of the adaptation.
Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Psychological Adaptation to Sexual Coercion in Victims and
Offenders, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMNIST PERSPECTIVES 90
(David Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996).
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environment can alone yield behavior, neither proximate nor ultimate
causes are superior to the other. Just as length and width of a rectangle
combine to yield area, proximate and ultimate causes are inextricably
entwined. And behavior, including all law-relevant behavior, and
including rape behavior, is the product of both.
B. Two VIEws REVISITED: THE ROLES OF SOCIAL AND LIFE SCIENCES
I began by observing that social science perspectives on rape and life
science perspectives on rape were over-divided and inappropriately treated
as necessarily competitive. One may wonder why an effort intended to
help integrate these perspectives has spent so much space describing
divisive processes. Indeed, it may be tempting, having divided theories of
meaning from theories of causes, to conclude that social sciences would
only illuminate the former, life sciences only the latter, and we would
merely have replicated another reason to maintain the social science-life
science division that I had earlier protested. That would be a mistake.
Admittedly, it will more often than not be the case that views from the
realm of meaning will be refined through contributions of the social
sciences.51 But insights in the realm of causation can and should be
furthered by both social sciences and life sciences. Here, the social
sciences are most likely to contribute to the identification and
understanding of proximate causes. The life sciences may be most useful
in offering insights about ultimate causation, but also can contribute to
identifying and explaining the operation of proximate causes.
V. TWO COMPLEXITIES OF TRANSITION
The transition to behavioral models of rape that include biobehavioral
insights raises at least two kinds of complexities. This Part addresses each
in turn.
A. OVERLAPPING CONCEPTS
Views from the realms of meaning and cause obviously intersect in the
nature of rape behavior itself. But there will in some contexts be a deeper
interactivity between the two than might first appear. This is because, in
the end, the realms cannot be inconsistent with each other.
1. On The Causes of Meanings
Because meaning exists in the brain, and the brain is an evolved
information processor, behavioral biology is necessarily implicated in the
construction of meaning. One would not want to push the relevance of this
too far, since observing in this particular context that all analytical abilities
51. However, to the extent that ascertaining meaning often invokes morality, the
evolutionary, biobehavioral perspectives on the visceral fundaments of moral sentiments are
once again relevant. See generally Jones, On the Nature of Norms, supra note 6.
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and capacity for free choice and decision-making are also products of an
evolutionary process could seem almost trivially true.
What I have in mind, instead, are those contexts in which meanings are
most closely derived from aspects of human emotion. For example, rape
can be interpreted to be a bad thing, in part, because of the emotional
distress it inflicts on victims and those who care about them. There are
both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that these emotions are,
themselves, evolved psychological adaptations, which culture both reflects
and reciprocally augments and influences. So the life sciences can in some
ways contribute to even our understanding of why we, as humans male and
female, tend to find rape so excruciatingly repugnant, and why every
known legal system, in every known human society, treats rape as a
powerfully significant and serious offense.
2. On The Meanings of Causes
In addition, there will be times when new insights on causation affect
theories in the realm of meaning. This will primarily be true whenever
conclusions about meaning necessarily depend on assumptions about
causation. For instance, the biobehavioral perspective on sexual aggression
strongly suggests that patterns of rape in humans reflect evolved male
psychology, and at least some component of sexual desire, (albeit often
appearing in concert with other proximate desires). To the extent some
interpretation of the meaning of rape is predicated on the complete absence
of any sexual component, that conclusion in the realm of meaning would be
weakened by robust findings in the realm of causation.
This potential interactivity between the realms of meaning and cause
may provide one of the bases for resisting conclusions from the realm of
cause that trace components of rape to sexual desire. That interactivity also
reflects one of the significant advantages of evolutionary analysis in law:
the clarification of policy tensions, and the improvement of cost-benefit
52analyses. That is the subject of the second complexity that the transition
may engender.
B. POLICY TENSIONS IN RAPE
On one hand, commentators rather broadly agree that reducing the
incidence of rape is an important goal.53 And to the extent a greater
understanding of the causes of rape helps us to reduce its incidence, law
furthers that goal. On the other hand, the literature on rape has effects that
reach beyond the rape context, and it is at least theoretically possible that
some beneficial effects could be jeopardized by developments in the realm
52. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 19, at 1236-40. For information
about the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL) see <www.sealsite.org>.
53. Economists would phrase this differently, saying that what we want to do is reduce
the sum of the costs of rape and the costs of preventing rape.
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of causation. For example, highlighting rape as one of the burdens
comparatively greater for women than for men has the laudatory effect of
fostering greater empathy for women, which can translate into concrete
political and economic benefits. Some of the diverse branches of feminism
go further, making much of the supposed absence of sexual component to
rape. In theory, at least, whatever marginal increase in the gains for
women depended on this particular interpretation of the causes of rape
might be perceived as vulnerable if that interpretation lost some credibility.
Put bluntly, an increase in law's effectiveness to reduce the incidence
of rape may somewhat compromise the ability of rape literature to leverage
other gains for women. And, of course, there are potential costs to
important women's issues that arguably may follow from any widespread
misunderstanding about the proper qualifications on and limits of
explanations integrating social science thinking with the biology of
behavior. We would be foolish not to recognize these potential interactions
of the realms of cause and meaning.
The biology, itself, has absolutely nothing to say about how we should
value the relative cost and benefits of understanding the biobehavioral
influences on sexual aggression. That evaluative process can and should
take place in the usual arenas in which policy goals are weighed against
each other and set. But, at the very least, biobehavioral perspectives are
worth the serious consideration of those for whom the reduction of rape
and fear of rape is a primary goal. And, to the extent that evolutionary
analysis of rape clarifies the policy tensions, and helps us to loosely
quantify potential tradeoffs between existing policies, then it may serve to
help us guide legal mechanisms in a way that may help us to achieve some
net increase in our ability to pursue a number of important goals
simultaneously.
VI. CONCLUSION
All biological processes, including normal human brain development,
ultimately depend upon rich environmental inputs. Similarly, all
environmental influences can only be perceived, sorted, mentally analyzed,
and understood through biological and therefore principally evolved
processes. Consequently, it is increasingly clear that environmental
determinism is as incoherent as genetic determinism, and that no human
behavior can be fully understood from environmental or genetic
perspectives alone. Human behavior emerges from an information-
processing brain, the specialized and patterned functioning of which
reflects both a richly influential developmental environment and a distinct
history of relentless exposure to the operation of evolutionary processes.
This is relevant to law generally because law's effectiveness often
crucially depends on the accuracy of its behavioral models. And this is
relevant to rape law specifically because both theory and data strongly
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suggest that the potential reproductive consequences of forced copulation
to our male and female ancestors embedded in the male-typical and female-
typical psychologies context-specific predispositions (as common in our
species as in many others) that continue to affect the likelihood of sexual
aggression, and resistance to sexual aggression, respectively. A greater
understanding of the complexities of and causal influences upon rape
behavior may help to improve our ability to deter rape through the
environment-manipulating mechanisms of law.
The purpose of this article has been to explore how a transition in law
from using fragmented and isolated models of rape behavior to using more
unified and accurate models might best proceed. Specifically, I have
proposed several features important to an eventual integration of social
science and life science perspectives. Somewhat counter-intuitively, I have
proposed that a more systematic conceptual division must precede effective
integration. Sorting must precede synthesis.
First, a successful transition to an integrated model requires the self-
conscious and explicit disentanglement of two distinct kinds of theories:
one from the realm of meaning, the other from the realm of cause. This
will reduce academic contests for disciplinary hegemony by enabling
important contributions to the meaning of rape and to the causation of rape
to proceed simultaneously. Second, a successful transition requires the
disentanglement of two different kinds of causes: proximate (immediate)
and ultimate (evolutionary). Recognizing the ways in which these two
kinds of causes underlie all behavior provides a far better understanding of
the complex relationships between environmental conditions and behavior
than can be obtained from studying either kind of cause in isolation.
With their contributions to the rape literature similarly sorted (by
relevance to aspects of rape, rather than according to disciplinary
boundaries) the social science and life science views of rape will dovetail,
enabling a newly integrated understanding of rape phenomena. Within that
understanding lies ample accommodation for two simultaneous views of
the cube, one that highlights law's goals, the other that offers some insights
into ways to achieve them.
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